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GUIDELINES FOR COPING WITH NATURAL
DISASTERS AND CLIMATIC CHANGE
Howard Kunreuther and Paul Kleindorfer
1. INTRODUCTION
Today there is no prevailing wind as to how society should
cope with the economic and social impacts of weather and related
phenomena. A principal reason for this uncertainty is that the
question has only recently been raised as to what the responsi-
bility of the government and private sector should be. Thus,
even though mankind always has been plagued by problems of
extreme natural phenomena such as floods and earthquakes, it is
only within the past ten years that efforts have been underway
to evaluate an alternative set of adjustments for coping with
these problems. (White and Haas, 1975.) When one focuses on the
areas of climatic change and weather modification, then the
historical time clock associated with research on the economic,
social and political problems is even shorter. (See Schneider,
1976 and Cooper, 1978.)
The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework for
evaluating alternative programs for dealing with weather-related
risks. The framework emphasizes the impacts of limited informa-
tion or misinformation on behavior. When the decision processes
of the different actors are explicitly considered as a part of
the problem, then alternatives which involve some form of gov-
ernment regulation may turn out to be more attractive than would
otherwise have been the case.
2. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of a framework
for analysis, indicating the descriptive and prescriptive phases
of the process. The appropriate role of the public and private
sectors ("the prescriptive" phase) can be better understood if
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Figure 1 Framework for Analysis
-3-
the nature of the problem, institutional arrangements and
decisions processes ("the descriptive" phase) are clearly
spelled out. To illustrate consider two examples, one from the
natural hazards area and the other associated with the impact of
climatic change.
Nature of the Problem
At the outset one would like to have some understanding of
the historical context of the problem and the types of questions
that are being raised today.
Natural Hazards Example. Since 1953 the federal government has
played an increasing role in providing disaster relief. Few
individuals have protected themselves voluntarily with insurance
against the financial consequences of disasters. Many of these
uninsured victims have turned to the federal government after
having suffered losses, and Congress has responded with an in-
creasingly open hand. Should disastersbe treated as a public
responsibility or should residents of hazard prone areas bear
the financial costs of living there? What are the appropriate
programs to consider in making this choice and how should one
evaluate them?
Climatic Change Example. In 1974 a number of scientists inde-
pendently discovered that chlorine, one of the chemical elements
in chlorofluorcarbons, CFC, was effective in destroying atmos-
pheric gas ozone, although the magnitude of this change was
highly uncertain. Ozone absorbs much of the ultraviolet radia-
tion from the sun so that a reduction in its amount could cause
skin cancer. Furthermore, a reduction in ozone could lead to
climatic change but the actual effect could not be specified
precisely. A problem facing the government is what action
should be taken with respect to those manufacturers of aerosol
spray cans which use CFC as propellants. Given the uncertainty
associated with CFCs and ozone as well as the limited knowledge
as to what its impact is likely to be on the human population,
should spray cans be banned or are there other more appropriate
policies?
Institutional Arrangements
In order to design appropriate policies for these and other
problems we need to have an understanding of the institutional
a'rrangements which define the informational and authority re-
lationships among the relevant groups. Most problems normally
involve the consumer sector, the production or service sector
and the government sector as the relevant groups.
In the natural hazards example, we would want to understand
the types of interaction occupants of a hazard-prone area will
have with their insurance agents or companies regarding the.
purchase of disaster coverage. We also want to examine the
possible interactions between the insurance industry and the
government sector. For example, this may involve rate regula-
tion at the state level (e.g. earthquake rates), reinsurance
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at the federal level (e.g. flood reinsurance) or joint marketing
efforts behavior in the private and public sector (e.g. flood
coverage).
In the depletion of ozone example we would want to under-
stand what alternative options are open to consumers and the
affected businesses if aerosol sprays were taken off the market.
We would also want to know what possible regulations could be
issued by the government regarding the future use of CFC and
what evidence would be required to justify each specific ruling.
Decision Processes. Perhaps the most important aspect of des-
criptive analysis, and certainly the most neglected, is an
understanding of the decision processes of each of the different
actors involved in the problem. We define decision processes
to mean the collection, processing and dissemination of specific
types of information in determining and promoting a specific
course of action.
In the natural hazards example it is important to under-
stand how residents of hazard-prone areas evaluate the probabil-
ities and losses associated with such events as floods and earth-
quakes. In the same spirit we need to gain insight into what
information is collected and processed by insurance companies in
determining the anticipated benefits and costs of offering dif-
ferent types of coverage at specific premiums. We would then
want to understand what steps are taken by agents to market
coverage.
In the depletion of ozone example, it is relevant to know
what information scientists have collected to determine the
potential dangers of CFC to ozone and how certain they are of
the future impacts on the population. In the same spirit one
would want to better understand how these findings are inter-
preted by government regulatory agencies in handing down their
- -
pronouncements as to what action specific manufacturers must
take.
Fortunately we know considerably more today about the deci-
sion processes of individuals than we did a decade ago. Recent
empirical studies in field and controlled laboratory settings
have shed light on the behavioral processes associated with
collecting and utilizing information and the impact that these
phenomena are likely to have on policy prescriptions. In par-
ticular, Tversky and Kahneman(1974) have shown that individuals
exhibit systematic biases in their processing of information.
One of these biases, availability, implies that individuals
judge the probability of an event by the ease with which such
instances are readily retrieved from memory. Such a heuristic
implies that past experience will be a critical variable in in-
dividual decision-making with respect to certain events. This
finding suggests that individuals are likely to underestimate
their chances of being affected in the future by low probability
events which have not personally affected them in the past.
Calabrasi (1970) makes a similar point by observing that "such
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things always happen to the other guy and no aWDunt of statisti-
cal information can ever convince the individual that they can
happen to him". (p. 56).
The importance of
processing of occupants
a study by Kates (1962)
LaFollette, Tennessee.
tured that:
past experience
in hazard-prone
who interviewed
On the basis of
in affecting information
areas is illustrated in
110 individuals in
his findings he conjec-
Men on flood plains appear to be very much prisoners
of their experience. . •• Recently experienced floods
appear to set an upper bound to the size of loss with
which managers believe they ought to be concerned.
(p. -40).
In evaluating the decision processes of individuals and
firms it is also relevant to learn from what sources decision-
aiding information is obtained. The extensive literature on
the diffusion of innovations (see Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971)
indicates that the mass media are normally the initial source
of knowledge about a product but the information from more per-
sonal sources is usually obtained prior to its ｡ ､ ｯ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ This
pattern of behavior is cons-isten-t·wit:h one of the- classlc
studies in this area, Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966), on the
adoption of a new medical drug by doctors in four mid-western
communities. The study indicates that salesmen and direct mail
were the most frequent source of original knowledge about the
drug, but just prior to adoption the doctor was most likely to
seek out a colleague or consult a professional journal article.
Another general finding in the empirical literature on innova-
tions is that individuals are reluctant to spend much time col-
lecting and processing information. The accuracy of their own
data to a large extent will be dependent on those of their
colleagues and friends. From a prescriptive point of view these
findings .suggest that informal contacts may play at least as
important a role in providing information as the market system.
Finally, there is literature emerging which indicates that
individual attitudes toward risk are impacted by the way infor-
mation is diffused and processed. Kunreuther et ale (1978) in
a field of survey of 3,000 homeowners in flood and earthquake
prone areas found that people's decisions to purchase insurance
were determined by past experience with floods or earthquakes
and interpersonal contact with other policyholders rather than
by a comparison of the risk involved in relation to the benefits
of insurance. In a complementary set of controlled laboratory
experiments on insurance Slovic et ale (1977) found that indivd-
uals preferred to insure themselves against high probability-low
loss events rather than against catastrophes which had a very
small chance of occurrence. These findings imply that individ-
uals may view uncertainty and risk in a different way than has
traditionally been assumed by economists.
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Prescriptive Analysis
The descriptive phase encompases problem formulation,
institutional arrangements and decision processes of the different
parties in response to different information. They are a funda-
mental input to the prescriptive phase, which is concerned with
the specification and evaluation of a set of alternative policies.
The options include relying primarily on market mechanisms so
that individuals and firms have free choice as to what actions
they pursue, or having the government intervene in the process
through regulation, the use of incentives or the direct provision
of specific services. Let us illustrate each of these alternatives
within the context of the two specific examples presented above.
Rely on Market Mechanisms. In the case of disaster insur-
ance, this alternative would consist of allowing individuals
and businesses to locate in specific areas, take their chances
with respect to a potential catastrophe and bear any losses them-
selves or through voluntary insurance coverage. The ozone de-
pletion problem would be viewed as a concern of consumers and
businesses. Information could be made publicly available through
journals and the mass media that the use of certain types of
aerosol cans may have harmful environmental effects. The res-
ponsibility for initiating any changes would be in the hands of
consumers through their purchase decisions and with firms through
their production decisions.
Institute Regulations. The government could play an active
role in mitigating losses from natural hazards by imposing specific
land-use controls and building codes on new structures slated to
be built in hazard-prone areas. Home-owners applying for govern-
ment-financed VA and FHA mortgages for new construction in these
areas could also be required to purchase insurance as a condition
for such a loan.
With respect to CFC emissions form spray cans, the government
could impose a regulation which would ban the use of CFC as of a
specified date. The choice of this deadline might reflect the
tradeoffs between the costs of continuing to produce a "harmful"
product and the economic and social disruption associated with
preemporily banning its use.
Develop Incentives. The government could develop incentives
for protecting ｨ ｯ ｭ ･ ｾ ｯ ｷ ｮ ･ ｲ ｳ against the financial losses from
natural disasters by subsidizing insurance premiums on existing
structures in order to make coverage more attractive. In the
same spirit, property tax rates could reflect the degree of risk
associated with locating in a particular area. Similar measures
could be utilized with respect to coping with the CFC-ozone pro-
lem. Subsidies or tax credits could be provided to businesses
who were capable of producing substitutes for CFC. In particular,
the government might provide a lUMp sum transfer to the CFC in-
1ustry to aid them in a reconversion process. As an alternative,
the government could impose severe taxes on the CFC industry so
that firms would have an incentive to develop alternative products
which would not threaten to pollute the atmosphere.
of
hazard-
If the
the
few.
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Direct Provision of Services. One way to cope with the
financial consequences of natural disasters would be to have the
government provide liberal relief to victims in the form of grants
and low-interest loans. By providing this type of aid, there
would be less incentive for individuals to purchase insurance
coverage than.if the government were to do nothing. In the case
of the CFC problem, the government could provide information
services to the public as to the potential adverse effects of
using aerosol sprays. If there were great uncertainty on the
impact of CFC on the environment, then the government would have
to determine carefully the form in which the message should be
presented. How can one make a wise choice among these different
options? There are two general criteria which should be explic-
itly considered in evaluating the different options.
A. Impact on Allocation of Resources
Each one of the possible courses of action will determine
how individuals and firms will operate. For example, if the
government decided to do nothing to protect victims against dis-
astrous losses and no insurance were available, then some firms
and households may prefer not to locate in certain hazard-prone
areas. To the extent that these units aided our economic growth
and development this might be considered a loss to society. Re-
gulating hazard-prone areas would produce the same type of
tradeoffs. On the other side of the coin, there are a set
negative consequences associated with the development of a
prone area which society must pay for one way or another.
public sector incurred the financial costs associated with
disaster, then society would be paying for the losses of a
The problem of resource allocation is considerably more
complex when one moves from the financial consequences of natural
hazards to the physical and economic consequences of environmental
hazards such as the depletion of ozone due to CFC. In such cases,
one has to balance the positive economic impact of these activities
with the potential negative consequences, not only for the present
generation, but also for future generations. We require consider-
able information on the short-run and long-run impacts of certain
actions in order to make final judgments on resource allocation
effects.
B. Impact on Equity and Distribution of Resources
A second measure which should be considered in choosing
among alternatives is the impact of different measures on the
welfare of members of society. If society feels that it is their
responsibility to aid victims of natural catastrophes because
that is a risk all of us should bear, then liberal federal dis-
aster relief would be an inappropriate policy option for consid-
eration. Such a decision may also be suggested because of income
distribution concerns. If, on the other hand, there is a feeling
that people should be responsible for the consequences of their
actions, then some combination of the other options may be
desirable.
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When one moves out of the relatively simplistic world of
natural hazards to the physical and economic impact of climate
changes then the equity and distributional questions become
intimately connected with legal issues of responsibility. If
one takes the position that those who undertake specific actions
must also bear the costs, then environmental problems associated
with using CFCs may have to be handled by either some form of
regulation or a tax imposed on firms. Without these measures,
consumers and firms are unlikely to take preventive ·action. In
economic terms, the benefit associated with restricting CFCs can
be treated as a public good. In other words, the consumer gets
so little perceived benefit to himself of not using aerosol
sprays that he continues to do. Similarly, firms producing the
good have no incentive to change their behavior. If CFCs were
not produced, society might be better off with respect to a re-
duction in environmental hazards. If instead one feels that the
private sector should monitor its own activities, then a laissez
faire approach might be viewed as desirable.
The impact of different policies on resource allocation,
equity and distribution of resources will be intinafely related
to the descriptive phase of the process. For ･ ｸ ｡ ｾ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ Ｌ the types
of institutional arrangements will indicate how information is
collected and disseminated among the relevant parties. An under-
standing of the decision processes will provide insight into how
information is processed or misprocessed by the relevant groups.
We will, now elaborate on the specific natural "na"zardsexample
to illustrate how one links the descriptive and prescriptive
phases.
3. LINKING DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: THE CASE
OF DISASTER INSURANCE
Descriptive Phase
Between 1973 and 1977 a multidisciplinary team supported by
funds from the National Science Foundation, were determining the
critical factors influencing the voluntary purchases of insurance
aainst the consequences of low-probability events such as flood
or earthquakes. Descriptive research methods included a field
survey and laboratory experiments. The field survey permitted
the discovery of differences between insured and uninsured home-
owners in hazard-prone areas, while the laboratory experiments
permitted us to identify causal relationships through controlled
manipulation of relevant variables.
The basic sampling plan for the field survey involved face-
to-face interviews with 2,055 home-owners living in flood prone
areas through the United States, and 1,006 home-owners in eighteen
earthquake prone areas of California. Approximately half of the
sample individuals were insured against flood or earthquake.
The analysis of the field survey revealed that a significant
number of home-owners in flood and earthquake prone areas either
knew nothing about the availability and terms of insurance, or
had inaccurate information. The survey also revealed that many
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residents had little idea of the probability or potential damage
from a future disaster. One of the most surprising results was
the large number of uninsured home-owners who expected no federal
aid at all in the aftermath of a major disaster. This indicated
that neglect of insurance could not be attributed to expectations
of generous government relief.
In the laboratory experiments, subjects were presented with
a series of gambles, each of which involved a specified probabil-
ity of losing a given amount of money. Losses and probabilities
were varied across gambles. In one experiment subjects were per-
mitted to buy insurance against the loss at an actuarially fair
rate. Additional experiments varied the premiums so that insur-
ance was offered at subsidized rates and commercial rates. In
these experiments, subjects considered well-defined insurance
problems in isolation and without real stakes at risk. To sup-
plement this format, an elaborate farm management game was de-
signed and run by a computer. While playing this game over a
five-hour period, individuals had to decide for each year which
crops they were going to plant, what fertilizers to use, and
what insurance they would purchase against various natural
hazards. Subjects' earnings in the game determined their
salary.
The results from the experiments consistently showed that
people preferred to insure against relatively high-probability,
low-loss hazards and tended to reject insurance in situations
where the probability of loss was low and the potential losses
were high. These results suggest that people's natural predis-
position run counter to what would be predicted by normative
models of choice such as expected utility theory which assumes
that risk-averse individuals should desire a mechanism to pro-
tect themselves from rare catastrophic losses that they could
not bear themselves.
When asked about their insurance decisions, subjects in
both the laboratory and survey studies indicated a disinclination
to worry about low-probability hazards. Such a strategy is
understandable in view of the fact that limitations of people's
time, energy, and attentional capacities create a "finite re-
servoir of concern". Unless we ignored many low-probability
threats we would become so burdened that any sort of productive
life would become impossible. Another insight gleaned from the
experiments and the survey is that people think of insurance as
an investment. Making claims and receiving payments (by insur-
ing against more probable losses) seems to be viewed as a return
on the premium. Insuring against hazards that do not occur seems
a waste of money.
Prescriptive Phase
The above study suggests that the primary cause of failure
of the disaster insurance market is consumer disinterest. If
insurance is to be marketed on a voluntary basis, then consumer's
attitudes and information processing limitations must be taken
into account. Policymakers and insurance providers must find
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ways to communicate the risks and arouse concern for the hazards.
One method found to work in the laboratory experiments is to
increase the perceived probability of disaster by lengthening
the individual's time horizon. For example, considering the
risks of experiencing a 100-year flood at least once during a
25-year period, instead of considering the risks in one year,
raises the probability to .22 and may thus cast flood insurance
in a more favorable light. Another step would have insurance
agents play an active role in educating homeoWners--a"bout -- the
proper use of insurance as a protective mechanism and providing
information about the availability of insurance, rate schedules,
deductible values, etc. Of course, these actions may not be
effective. It may also be necessary to institute some form of
mandatory coverage, perhaps having banks and other financial
institutions require disaster insurance as a condition for a
mortgage.
4. SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON CLIMATIC CHANGE
A parallel type of analysis appears appropriate for evalu-
ating the impacts of technological developments on climatic
change. The descriptive and prescriptive phases of the analysis,
however, are considerably more complex because we do not cur-
rently have a good understanding of the cause and effect rela-
tionship between human and natural processes and climatic
changes. Furthermore, we are uncertain as to the long-range
impact that specific atmospheric or other patterns will have on
human society. We will discuss future research questions in the
context of the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1.
Nature of the Problem
The large variation of past weather patterns from year to
year make it extremely difficult both to project long-term
trends in climatic change and to separate out changes due to
human tampering (e.g., technology, population growth) from natu-
ral causes. Furthermore, there is disagreement among atmospheric
scientists as to the impact that certain changes in climate will
have on economic and social conditions in the world.
An interesting example illustrating the above points is the
recent controversy concerning the impact of additional carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere caused by the burning of fossil fuels
(i.e., coal, oil and gas) and clearing of land (i.e., destruction
of plant life and soil organic matter). The most generally
accepted models all predict that an increased carbon dioxide will
increase temperatures near the ground. However, these models
neglect feedback mechanisms for clouds and ocean circulation so
that a number of respected scientists feel that a global cooling
trend still predominates. They support this hypothesis by citing
the lack of warming during the industrial period since 1940
(Cooper, p. 504).
Other scientists feel that an increase in carbon dioxide
will playa significant role in impeding the earth's emitted
radiation, thus warming the atmosphere through the so-called
"greenhouse effect." The process is called the "greenhouse
effect" because carbon dioxide acts in the same manner as a
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greenhouse. It is completely transparent to the wavelengths of
light produced by the sun but absorbs the earth's emitted radia-
tion, partly transmitting it back to earth and partly out to
space. The resulting warming effect is similar to that produced
by a greenhouse which is transparent to incoming solar radiation
but impedes outgoing heat radiation.
There is thus uncertainty about how much temperature change
will result from a given increased level of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere. Furthermore, there is great uncertainty on the
impact that changes in temperature will have on agricultural pro-
ductivity in certain parts of the world. Colder climatic zones
could now become more productive if indeed there is a warming
effect while other areas will suffer. The uncertainties associ-
ated with the problem create difficulties in designing meaningful
policies.
scientists also have limited knowledge on the interrealtion-
ship between the impacts of weather modification in one part of
the world and its effects on other parts of the globe. A graphic
example of this climatic dependence is provided by Hurricane Inez
which threatened the Gulf Coast in 1968. The storm never hit the
U.s. but filled large portions of the Mexican ,altiplano with
sufficient water to assure the area of favorable crops for a
season (Schneider, p. 21). The analysis of benefits and costs
of undertaking weather modification actions, such as seeding of
hurricanes, has to reflect the potential impacts on a global
rather than national level. Naturally the analysis becomes more
cumbersome and uncertain as the outcome space is broadened in
this way.
Instituti0nal ｾ ｲ ｡ ｮ ｧ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ Ｎ There is a natural bias in
coping with problems, where long-term effects are uncertain and
phenomena are understood only imperfectly, to concentrate pri-
marily on the short-term impacts of specific actions. Normally
any measure to ban or regulate human activities will produce
negative economic and political consequences. Since politicians
are elected at relatively short intervals they have little incen-
tive to endorse specific bans which may adversely affect their
constituencies. There is a need to understand in what ways the
points of view of different interest groups affected by a
specific problem--consumers, industries, governments, unborn
generations--are impacted by current institutional arrangements.
For example, in developing a program for coping with the impact
of climatic change on food reserves the U.S. Department of
Agriculture is the sole source of technical information for
developing policy. Critics contend that the USDA favors the
largest food producer and that information from other food
experts should also provide advice to the executive branch as
part of the policy making process (Schneider, p.43).
Finally, it is also important to understand the relation-
ship between the institutional arrangements and the responsibility
for certain actions. For example, if the federal government is
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held responsible for negative outcomes of certain actions, such
as weather modifications, then they will have an incentive to
do nothing. As a case in point, consider the disastrous flood
in Rapid City, South Dakota on June 9, 1972, which caused $163
million in property damage. Only a few hours before the flood
the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology under contract
with the Department of the Interior carried on a cloud seeding
operation known as Project Skywater near Rapid City. A class-
action suit has been brought against the Federal Government on
the grounds that the cloud seeding operation was dangerous and
hence should not have been undertaken (Scheider, p. 237).
Meteorologists are uncertain as to whether the cloud seeding
operation could have caused the flood. What is more certain is
the reluctance of the Federal Government to undertake such ex-
periments in the future even if the expected benefits exceed
the expected costs. Being held financially responsible for
negative outcomes and only gaining psychic rewards for beneficial
results produces a strong bias towards not acting at all.
Decision Processes. We have already emphasized the imperfect
information processing capabilities of individuals and the limited
amount of data they use. In areas such as climatic change and
weather modification, which are sufficiently complex and where
the ways of evaluating different options lie beyond our indivi-
dual knowledge and understanding, there is a tendency for us to
rely on experts and authorities for guidance. Should there be
considerable uncertainty and disagreement among scientists and
policy makers as to the consequences of different measures,
policy makers are likely to trust no one and maintain the status
quo. This behavior will be reinforced by a natural bias to do
nothing unless the organization is faced with a severe problem
or crisis situation. There is substantial evidence from the
organizational behavior literature supporting this point. For
example, March and Simon (1958) in the analysis of organizational
change have concluded that the individual or organization does
not search for new alternatives unless the present course is
perceived to be unsatisfactory. Only after a problem of crisis
exists is there a need to take action. Lawless (1977) has
documented the importance of public alarm in triggering remedial
action with respect to social shock over technology. In a
series of short case histories of recent episodes he documented
the sequence of events leading to public alarm and the impact of
this concept on specific regulatory actions. Schneider (1976)
also provides a number of examples in the area of climatic
change which illustrate the importance of a perceived crisis in
order to generate change.
Prescriptive Phase
Guidelines for a prescriptive strategy in the area of weather
modification and climatic change can be based on the nature of
the risk and its outcome. The following concepts may be useful
in beginning to reflect on the merits of alternative courses of
action.
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Degree of Reversibility. If the impact of certain atmo-
spheric emissions cannot easily be reversed in the future then
it may be necessary to undertake protective measures today even
where the impact of the climatic change cannot be easily
estimated. One reason that scientists are concerned with the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is that it
seems unlikely that even the most advanced future technology
will make feasible its removal (Cooper, 1978, p. 510). Future
research should be undertaken to understand better the degree
of reversibility of different phenomenon.
Risk Associated with Certain Activities. As the probability
and magnitude of loss associated with specific activities (e.g.,
use of CFCs) increases, then regulations will prove more desir-
able, other things being equal. Scientists need to obtain better
data on the relationship between atmospheric emissions and
climatic change before making a strong case for remedial action.
Adjustment Process. The more difficult it is for society
to undertake effective actions at the onset or immediately after
a severe crisis the more important long-range planning becomes.
In the case of climatic change Schneider feels that the crises,
which will occur if we do not plan now, will be catastrophic
so that relatively little could be done in the short-run to
cope with its impact. He proposes instead a stragegy on "pru-
dence, negotiation and margins of safety in all our future
planning so that we are adequately prepared for such probable
misfortunes as extended periods of bad weather and their harm-
ful effects on crops". (p. 39).
Responsibility. We need to clarify who will be responsible
for the costs of undertaking changes prior to a crisis and who
is responsible after a catastrophe occurs. The proposed policies
will be very different if governmental agencies are held fully
accountable for coping with problems of climatic change than if
consumers and businesses are expected to share the risk.
The above concepts suggest the following five stage process
for developing and analyzing prescriptive measures.
1. Specification of Adjustments. Experts individually or
in groups should develop an alternative set of adjustments to
cope with a particular problem. For example, in the CFC-ozone
example one could consider the following set of adjustments:
banning the aerosol can in 1981, waiting to ban the can until
1984, not banning the can, taxing the producers of aerosol cans,
etc.
2. Scenario Generation. Experts should develop a set of
scenarios outlining possible outcomes associated with different
actions. They should carefully document what we know and do
not know about specific phenomena and their potential conse-
quences.
3. Group Discussions. Experts from relevant physical and
social sciences should engage in a group discussion to determine
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the probabilities and outcomes from each scenario. They should
jointly recognize the uncertainty associated with certain events
and provide a detailed specification of the multidimensional
nature of the outcomes (e.g., economic impact, environmental
impact, quality of life impact).
4. Evaluation of Scenarios. A procedure should be agreed
upon for evaluating different scenarios with respect to pre-
specified objectives. In this process there is a need to under-
stand the potential conflicts among different interest groups
(e.g., consumers, firms directly or indirectly affected by the
adjustment, government, etc.). Some attention should be paid
to the accuracy of information which each group has.
5. Implementation. The necessary changes in organization
and institutional arrangements should be determined as a function
of specific policies. For example, what governmental impact
would certain regulatory measures or tax incentives have on
governmental agency's responsibility in coping with a particular
climatic change problem?
The above procedure is a general one which could be fol-
lowed in coping with a wide variety of policy-related issues.
In the case of climatic change and weather modification, the
need for a systematic evaluation of alternatives and consequences
by experts from different groups is particularly critical because
of the potentially grave but uncertain consequences certain
phenomena are likely to have on the world in the next few de-
cades. Whether or not such a process will be followed for
coping with weather remains to be seen.
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